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1 Introduction
The Kyoto Protocol, negotiated in 1997, represents international e¤orts to reach agreement
on a policy regime that will reduce and ultimately reverse global warming. Yet the Sixth
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(COP6) failed in its stated objective of moving The Parties towards rati…cation of the Pro-
tocol in their domestic legislatures4.
The purpose of this chapter is to understand one particular aspect of current resistance
to rati…cation of the Kyoto Protocol. We focus on objections by developing countries, whose
concerns appear misplaced when set against predictions that they stand to gain under im-
plementation of the Kyoto Protocol. According to studies using large scale economic models
cited by the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD 2000) the ‡ow
of “green” funds to the developing world is projected to be between US$5bn and US$17bn
by 2010. However, we present a simple analytical framework and examples in which less
wealthy countries may be made worse o¤ under the sort of regime being proposed.
As it stands, the way that developing countries would be involved with the regime set
out in the Kyoto Protocol is through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Under this
system, it is envisaged that …rms from developed countries would be able to build plants
that embody more environmentally friendly technology than was used at the time in the
developing country, and thereby earn ‘carbon credits’ that could be o¤set against emissions
at home. There are no emissions restrictions currently imposed on developing countries.
At face value, it is di¢cult to see how a developing country could be harmed under such a
scheme, particularly as it can always reject a proposed deal under the CDM. (Further details
on this, and other background information on the Kyoto Protocol, can be found in Moomaw
et al 1999).
Arguably, concern amongst developing countries really lies with anticipated developments
under the Kyoto Protocol, particularly with proposed caps on future emissions levels. Al-
4COP6 was held in the Hague during November 2000 and at the time of writing is the most recent.
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ready, a number of developed countries are refusing to ratify the regime until developing
countries are made subject to emissions targets, even if these are above current emissions
levels. In recognition of this, we model a scheme that limits pollution by introducing a
permit requirement applied across all countries, and analyse the e¢ciency and equity impli-
cations of the scheme. Income varies across countries, with those at the bottom end of the
distribution representing ‘The South’ and those at top referred to as ‘The North’. We are
able to show that while the scheme might increase total social surplus by reducing pollution,
not all countries across the income distribution bene…t. These results are established against
a backdrop of trade between the two regions.
The model draws on earlier work by Kaneko and Wooders (1994) and is based on car use
by a continuum of (in…nitely small) consumers, and the resulting exhaust emissions. This
may seem a little incongruous, given that emissions permits are usually discussed in the
context of limiting pollution by large producers, who emit tons per year of greenhouse gases
such as CO2 as a by-product of industrial processes. In fact, the story of car use is told
as a parable for the interaction between market equilibrium in the global economic activity
that generates CO2 emissions and the externalities resulting from CO2 emissions themselves.
However, in taking this approach two issues must be addressed, one being whether the
appropriate focus can be on consumption rather than production, the other being whether
it is appropriate to assume that agents are small5.
On the …rst point, consumption is modelled rather than production deliberately to em-
phasise that the abatement decision depends ultimately on consumer preferences and the
individual’s budget constraint. Consumer preferences re‡ect the balance between the bene-
…t of consumption, in this case private car use, and the disutility from pollution. This would
continue to be the case if pollution resulted from production rather than consumption. The
5It is also worth noting that car use itself is estimated to contribute about 15 percent of overall global
CO2 emissions to the earth’s atmosphere (WRI 1994, 1999). And while car ownership has probably reached
saturation point in the US (at least in terms of the numbers of cars per person), at 750 cars per 1000
polulation, markets in India and China are far from saturated, at 7 or 8 per 1000. Therefore, in the future,
policies to control car use may be a very important part of a global strategy to control car use, and a permit
trading scheme may be one way of achieving this result. But this is not the central focus of the present
paper.
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consumer budget constraint accounts for the increased cost of driving when permits must
be purchased in addition to a car. If the permit cost were borne by the producer, who then
passed this on to consumers through the price mechanism, the e¤ect would essentially be the
same but less clearly visible. On the second question of whether agents may appropriately be
modelled as small, this is consistent with the assumption of a widespread externality. That
is, each individual consumer’s impact on the total stock of pollution is insigni…cant and thus
the consumer does not take account of the e¤ects of his own actions on levels of pollution.
Turning to supply considerations, previous research by Hahn (1984) and by Borenstein
(1988) has identi…ed e¢ciency losses that arise when a new market for tradable permits is
created. This ine¢ciency is driven by incentives of strategic interaction between …rms. Hahn
(1984) derives ine¢ciencies from the fact that …rms’ private pro…ts are not necessarily equal
to the surplus that they generate, motivating too much or too little entry, leading to the
ine¢cient use of pollution permits. Borenstein (1988) analyses the ability of a monopolist
to manipulate the price of permits to its own advantage. By assuming that …rms behave
competitively, we deliberately suppress such strategic issues, distinguishing the nature of
the ine¢ciencies that we highlight from those identi…ed in the earlier literature. It should
be noted, however, that while we make the assumption of price-taking behaviour by …rms,
we could obtain analogous results with strategic behaviour. Introducing strategic behavior
would merely complicate the analysis and make it more di¢cult to untangle the sources of
deviations from e¢ciency.
Of course, the modelling of agents as small does not necessarily suppress all strategic
interaction, as a …nite number of (small) agents could in principle form a coalition. However,
the competitive equilibrium that we demonstrate is equivalent to the f-core (the set of
feasible states of the economy that cannot be improved upon by any coalition containing
only a …nite number of economic actors) which, in the presence of widespread externalities,
may not be Pareto-optimal. Our approach allows us to highlight the problems of widespread
externalities6.
6See, for example, Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989), Kaneko and Wooders (1989), and Hammond
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As a …nal remark on the set-up of the model, it must be made clear that our analysis
assumes lump-sum redistributions to be impossible or simply not made. There appears
to be support for this assumption in the literature on international policy making (see,
for example, Bagwell and Staiger 1999 and Dixit and Norman 1980 page 192), re‡ecting
recognition that in practice international redistributions are not large enough to increase
Pareto e¢ciency signi…cantly. In research in progress we show that in fact when pollution
permits are introduced it is not always possible for the gainers to compensate the loosers.
How does the introduction of the permit trading scheme make the South worse o¤?
In our model, the intuition is simple and stark. When incomes vary across countries, in
equilibrium it is the poor South that abates car use for the simple reason that it cannot
a¤ord both the cars and the permits required under the regime to be allowed to drive them.
The North bene…ts from lower overall car use while being able to go on using cars as before.
Perhaps the application to production has even greater resonance. Set up in these terms
of production, our model would say that the South could not a¤ord to build plant and
purchase the pollution permits required to produce. In actual fact, this appears to represent
the South’s greatest anxiety over the Kyoto Protocol.
How can the CDM be thought of in the context of a permit trading system? The carbon
credits earned by a Northern …rm that builds a plant in the South can essentially be thought
of as pollution permits in the context of a permit trading scheme. Under one version of the
system currently being proposed, pollution permits are bundled with plant in the South and
cannot be separated. We adopt the much more straightforward assumption that permits are
assets that exist in their own right and can be traded internationally. This is the system
currently being advocated by the “umbrella group” of countries, which includes the US,
Canada, Japan and Australia, but it is not at present clear whether it will actually be
adopted. But even if not, our framework could be adapted to consider ‘bundling’ under the
CDM as well.
The implications of permit trade in the context of international trade have also been
(1999).
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studied by Copeland and Taylor (1995, 2000). The …rst of their papers studies the endoge-
nous allocation of pollution permits by governments as a strategic variable. Therefore, the
total emissions allowed are not the result of an international agreement of the kind envisaged
under the Kyoto Protocol, but the outcome of individual government’s decisions. Copeland
and Taylor abstract from the usual equity issues that arise in the Heckscher-Ohlin type
framework on which their model is based by assuming that a single representative individual
in each country holds all the resources. The second of these papers focuses on aspects of the
Kyoto Protocol, and does highlight income e¤ects from permit trading, but these are driven
by price e¤ects resulting from the opening of international trade, and therefore are di¤erent
from the income e¤ects that we focus on. Our model deliberately suppresses terms of trade
e¤ects due to trade in goods, and highlights instead income e¤ects that arise from variation
in the underlying income distribution7.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, the basic model is set up. A free
market equilibrium, in which there are no policy interventions, is demonstrated to be Pareto
ine¢cient. This outcome is then used as a benchmark against which to measure the impact of
a permit trading regime. In Section 4, we analyse a scheme whereby individuals are endowed
with permits, but additional permits are required in order to drive a car. It is here that we
demonstrate how, because it results in all rationing of car use being undertaken by them,
poor countries are harmed by the introduction of such a policy. In this section, however,
we also show that variation in permit allocation can redress the income imbalance. Giving
more permits to the South than to the North tends to reverse this outcome, but means that
only the relatively rich in each region are able to drive.
In Section 5 politico-economic considerations are introduced. Political e¤ects arise be-
cause di¤erent income groups are a¤ected di¤erently by pollution permit allocation and
trade. We show that a minimum permit allocation, implying a minimum level of pollution,
7Proposition 7 of Copeland and Taylor (2000) states that when no terms of trade e¤ects arise by goods
trade then permit trade can have no adverse (Pareto) e¢ciency implications in their model. It is precisely
under these circumstances that we show adverse e¢ciency implications can in fact occur when income varies
across countries.
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is required in each region for the scheme to receive democratic support. The key implication
is that some environmental targets may be too demanding, in other words require too large
a reduction in pollution, to receive democratic support. This may apply, for example, to the
prediction that a 60% reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is necessary for a halt to global
warming (Hadley Centre 2000)8. Section 6 concludes by relating this work to complementary
research that we are undertaking on the general e¢ciency implications of permit trade in the
presence of income variation and a widespread externality (Wooders and Zissimos 2001).
2 The basic model
2.1 Car production, trade, emissions and welfare
The world is divided into two regions, North and South. Suppose that every point on
the (semi-open) unit interval represents a country. To de…ne the regional dimension, let
0 < b < 1 and suppose that those points on the interval [0; b) represent the South, with
the North constituted by the interval [b; 1). The welfare e¤ects of pollution are felt entirely
through the use of cars. The utility function of consumer i (the representative consumer in
country i 2 [0; 1)) is given by
ui (zi;mi; ¼) = mi +
®z
®¡1
®
i
®¡ 1 ¡ ·¼
where ® is a parameter greater than one, mi is a perfectly divisible composite good that we
can think of as money, and zi is the consumption level of cars. We have chosen this particular
utility function since it is monotonic increasing in money and cars and, in equilibrium,
consumers who purchase cars will each purchase one unit; in ongoing research this allows
8The politico-economic implications of permit trading have also been studied by Howe (1994) and Farrow
(1995). However, these earlier contributions focus on the political feasibility of di¤erent policies - tax versus
permit trading - and means of permit allocation - auctions as against grandfathering (allocation in proportion
with past emissions), given an environmental target. Our focus is di¤erent, holding the regime constant and
examining a range of targets, showing some of them to be politically infeasible.
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us to consider the e¤ects of variable car use and to compare the results with those of this
paper. The pollution level is given by ¼ =
R
[0;1) zi d¹, where ¹ is Lebesgue measure and · is
a parameter.
The budget constraint for individual i is given by
mi + pzi = Yi;
where p is the consumer price of a car and Yi is i’s income. The budget constraint can be
used to substitute for mi in the utility function. Solving for car demand, we assume that the
externality is widespread, so that consumers do not take it into account in their consumption
decisions. Di¤erentiating with respect to zi;
@ui
@zi
= z¡
1
®
i ¡ p:
Setting the …rst order condition equal to zero and solving for car demand by an individual,
we have
zi = p¡®:
As the car price rises, demand falls, an e¤ect that is modulated by ®.
The production technology for cars is assumed to be subject to constant returns, with
free entry, at a per-unit cost of c = 1. Therefore, the location of car production and trade
is not important in this model, neither from the perspective of terms-of-trade e¤ects nor in
terms of the pollution externality9.
In this analysis we model the decision of whether or not to purchase a car. A car is
assumed to be indivisible; it is not possible to buy a fraction of a car. In Section 3 and
9Production is not modelled explicitly; this paper presents a partial equilibrium analysis. Production
could be introduced, however, and the spirit of the conclusions of our results would continue to hold.
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sub-section 4.1 this assumption is of no consequence at equilibrium since consumers only
demand cars in single units at equilibrium. This assumption becomes important in sub-
section 4.2, where income varies across individuals. Any relatively poor individual unable
to a¤ord a car is assumed to be unable to purchase part of a car (say by leasing or hiring).
This might seem like a bold assumption, but in practice there is always some level at which
purchasing a car, or the services provided by a car, cannot be divided further. Car rental for
a limited period may be feasible, and desirable given that the marginal utility of consumption
is very high for small quantities, even if car purchase is beyond the budget constraint. But
at some level even car services through rental are indivisible; a car cannot be rented for less
than a day. And in the real world there are some individuals for whom a day’s car hire is
una¤ordable. It is in order to highlight the equity issues that arise in this type of situation
that our assumption regarding the indivisibility of car purchases is made. A drawback to the
assumption of indivisibility of cars is that the widespread externality is associated with the
number of cars on the road, rather than how much each one is used. In mitigation it could
be assumed that all individuals use their cars the same amount, or that we are concerned
with average damage per car. Either of these approaches require the additional simplifying
(and reasonable) assumption that per-capita car use does not increase as the level of car
ownership falls. In related analysis of permit trading (Wooders and Zissimos 2001) we lift
this assumption, analysing perfect divisibility of car services.
3 A free international market for cars
The purpose of this section is to show the Pareto ine¢ciency of the free market solution when
the impact of the widespread externality on welfare is large and negative. This motivates
the introduction of tradable permits in subsequent sections.
We assume Yi > 1 for all i. (Thus, there are assumed to be no regional systematic or
signi…cant di¤erences in income.) This assumption ensures that all markets clear and trade
is balanced in equilibrium. In the absence of intervention, a competitive equilibrium in this
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economy is
p = 1
z¤i = p
¡® = 1 for all i 2 [0; 1).
This just says that when no individual is constrained by income in their choices of z10,
then each individual will choose to buy one car at the competitive price. Given perfect
competition in production, su¢cient quantities of cars are produced to meet world demand
at a price p = 1.The utility of the competitive outcome for consumer i is
ui (zi;mi; ¼) = Yi +
®z
®¡1
®
i
®¡ 1 ¡ z
¤
i p¡ ·
Z
[0;1)
zi d¹
= Yi +
1
® ¡ 1
µ
1
p
¶®¡1
¡ ·
Z
[0;1)
µ
1
p
¶®
d¹;
and, setting p = 1,
ui (zi;mi; ¼) = Yi +
®z
®¡1
®
i
® ¡ 1 ¡ z
¤
i ¡ ·
Z
[0;1)
zi d¹
= Yi +
1
®¡ 1 ¡ ·
Z
[0;1)
d¹;
For · > 1 the average damage from pollution is greater than the average bene…t. This can be
seen more clearly by setting ® = 2. In the competitive outcome, utility enjoyed by consumer
i is
u¤i (zi;mi; ¼) = Yi + 1 ¡ ·
Given the competitive outcome, any reduction in demand would raise welfare. However, the
consumers in each country are too small to have a signi…cant impact on pollution. For the
remainder of this paper we continue to assume · > 1.
10We follow Jane Austen in our use of the plural to avoid the use of “he” or “she”.
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4 ‘Giving up the car’ with tradable permits
Those who want to portray environmental regulation in its starkest terms often talk in terms
of being forced to ‘give up the car’. In this section we look at a scheme where pollution is
reduced because a proportion of individuals choose to give up their cars voluntarily through
the introduction of a tradable permit scheme; that is, a proportion of individuals are indif-
ferent between having to purchase permits and a car on the one hand and selling the permits
allocated to them by the scheme on the other. We show an equilibrium in which welfare for
each individual, whether they choose to have a car or not, is higher under the scheme than
under the free market outcome of the previous section.
Suppose that an international agreement is reached whereby the representative consumer
in each country is endowed with 2 permits, but required to have 4 permits in order to purchase
a car. International trade in permits is allowed, making it possible to obtain 4 tickets if
desired. It is immediately evident that the permit regime is set up so that car use is reduced
by a half. That is, instead of the entire world’s population owning and using a car, only half
does so. This is admittedly a very simple scheme, and in practice, the allocation of permits
is likely to much more complex and contentious. But two purposes are served in taking this
approach. First, whilst the regional distribution of permit allocations will be varied in the
analysis of this section and the next, the restrictiveness of the regime in reducing car use
by a half is held constant, helping to highlight the di¤erences between the regimes. Second,
denoting by C the set of car users, the analysis is simpli…ed because we know a priori that
¼ =
R
i2C zi =
1
2 .
4.1 E¢ciency considerations
Suppose that individuals in all countries have income Yi > 2. This is su¢cient for a new
equilibrium to be attained under the tradable permit scheme where all consumers are in-
di¤erent between having the income from the sale of permits and having the use of a car.
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Utility when an individual uses a car is given by
ui = Yi +
1
® ¡ 1
µ
1
p
¶®¡1
¡ 2t¡ ·
Z
i2C
µ
1
p
¶®
d¹
where t is the price of a permit. The second term re‡ects the utility from car use, and the
third shows disutility from having to purchase two permits. When a car is not bought, utility
is given by
ui = Yi + 2t¡ ·
Z
i2C
µ
1
p
¶®
d¹;
where utility is derived from sale of the permit endowment. At an equilibrium permit price,
every consumer is indi¤erent between using a car and buying 2 permits on one hand and
selling 2 permits on the other. Equating utility levels for purchasers and nonpurchasers of
cars, we have
1
® ¡ 1
µ
1
p
¶®
¡ 2t = 2t:
The competitive supply price of a car is the same as before; p = pc = 1. Therefore,
t¤ =
1
4 (®¡ 1)
For t¤ to clear the permit market, half of all consumers must sell their permits and forgo
the right to drive a car. This reduces car usage to half the level under the free-market
outcome of Section 3. The level of welfare can be compared across regimes. Imposing the
same parameter values as in the previous section, that is ® = 2 and · > 1, we have
u¤¤ = Yi +
(1 ¡ ·)
2
> Yi + 1 ¡ · = u¤ for all i in [0; 1),
with t¤ = 14 . This shows that welfare for each individual is higher under the controlled
market solution, for those in North and South alike. A Pareto-improvement requires that
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no individual be reallocated any positive amount of the right to drive a car.
For reduction of car use to be welfare improving from the free market solution, each
consumer in every country must have enough income so that in equilibrium the consumer
is indi¤erent between purchasing the permits required to drive a car and selling their en-
dowment of permits. If this is not the case, the outcome may change signi…cantly, bringing
about important redistributional repercussions.
Note that the present example is constructed around ® = 2. When ® < 2, we require
a larger value of · to make reduction of car use welfare improving in equilibrium. For
example, when ® = 32 , we must have · > 2 for reduction by a half to be Pareto superior
to the free market outcome. Symmetrically, for ® > 2, reduction of car use by a half can
increase welfare for · < 1. One way to proceed would be to investigate fully the relationship
between parameters and the ranking of outcomes under the respective regimes. However,
our purpose here is rather to indicate the possibility that, for some values of ®; a given
reduction in car use brings about a Pareto improvement. We then demonstrate that when
the income distribution varies across individuals this result can break down. This we now
do, basing our example on the value ® = 2.
4.2 Equity considerations
To illustrate possible equity implications of introducing a market for tradable permits, we
now modify the model so that countries in the South are poor relative to those in the North.
Let the income distribution Yi be given by
Y (i) = 1 +
°
(1 ¡ i) for all i in [0; 1); (1)
where ° < 18 . The poorest country is at i = 0. Incomes increase with i at an increasing
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rate11. The dividing line between North and South - the equator - is placed at b = 12 , so that
half of the world’s population resides in the North and half in the South. All countries in
the South are poorer than those in the North (see Figure 1).
Once again, we have an equilibrium where half of the consumers buy two permits and
a car, with the rest selling their permits. But now, it is those in the relatively poor South,
where income is given by (1) and i is in the interval [0; b) that sell their 2 permits and those
in the North (the interval [b; 1)) that buy the permits and use a car (see Figure 2). The
marginal consumer i = 12 uses all his endowment to buy a car and two permits at p = 1;
zi = p¡® = 1. He pays °(1¡i) = 2° for two permits; t
¤ = °. Now consider a consumer to the
left of i = 12 on the interval [0; 1). If he buys two permits at price t
¤ = ° each, he will not
be able to a¤ord to buy a car (zi = 1) at p = 1.
Under this outcome, assuming ® = 2 and 1 < · < 32 , we have
12:
u¤¤i = Yi + 2° ¡ ·2 < Yi + 1 ¡ · = u
¤
i for all i in [0; b);
u¤¤i = Yi + 1 ¡ 2° ¡ ·2 > Yi + 1 ¡ · = u
¤
i for all i in [b; 1):
Thus, the utility level u¤¤i for consumers in the North [b; 1) is higher than u¤i in the original
competitive equilibrium without traded permits, but for those in the South welfare is actually
lower. Notice that the smaller is °, the lower is the compensation that those in the South
receive for their permits, and the lower is their welfare in equilibrium. In summary, those
in the rich North are still able to use cars under the controlled market, while also bene…ting
from the fact that overall car use has been reduced. It is those in the South that are excluded
from car use all together.
11The functional form of the world income distribution given by (1) guarantees an interior solution. It
also implies that the richest countries have an in…nite income. The analysis still goes through for a …nite
cap on income levels, providing that, given parameter values, the cap is high enough for an interior solution.
We thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this point.
12Strictly speaking, for these inequalities to hold, we require only that 12 < · <
3
2 . However, we continue
to assume that · > 1, thus ensuring that the controlled market solution increases total social surplus.
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4.3 A larger Southern permit allocation
A natural question arises over what happens when the South is given a larger permit alloca-
tion relative to the North. We …nd that this does indeed improve the welfare of the relatively
rich consumers in the South, enabling them to drive a car. This occurs at the expense of
welfare of relatively poor consumers in the North, who cannot a¤ord permits.
To illustrate this, suppose that each country in the South is given 39 permits, with 40
being required to drive a car, while each Northern country is given just 1 permit. Set the
dividing line between North and South at b = 12 as before, so that the country at i =
1
2 is
the poorest country in the North.
In the previous example, the poorest consumer in the North was the marginal consumer.
With the current parameter values, we shall see that i = 12 cannot a¤ord to own a car in
equilibrium. To see this, suppose that i = 12 is the marginal consumer. Then consumer
i must use his entire endowment to purchase a car and 39 permits; thus, °=(1 ¡ 12) = 2°
must be the total cost of 39 permits. Therefore, t = 2°=39. But the richest consumer in
the South has to purchase only a single permit at this price, and this is a¤ordable. Thus,
all Northern consumers and at least one Southern consumer purchase permits at this price,
which implies that there must be excess demand for permits. Therefore, t = 2°=39 cannot
be a market clearing price. This price must rise to clear the permit market, which would
mean that i = 12 cannot a¤ord the 39 permits required, and will not be able to own a car
under the new equilibrium. It also suggests that some Southern consumers will be able to
a¤ord the single permit required to have a car.
To make this precise, …rst work out the market clearing condition for permit demand.
Let b1 and b2 be the measure of Southern and Northern consumers respectively who buy
permits. If the intention behind the tradable permit scheme is to reduce car use by a half,
then set
b1 + b2 =
1
2
:
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b1 is given by the distance from the point b = 12 to the marginal Southern consumer iS;
b1 =
¡1
2 ¡ iS
¢
. In the same way, b2 is the distance from the supremum at 1 to the marginal
Northern consumer iN ; b2 = (1 ¡ iN). See Figure 3 for an illustration. Using these in the
above identity,
iS + iN = 1:
The marginal Southern consumer uses their entire endowment to purchase a car and a single
ticket, while the marginal Northern consumer has to purchase a car and 39 tickets. Thus
°
1 ¡ iS = t and
°
1 ¡ iN = 39t
From these two preceding equations, we can solve for the equilibrium ticket price and
marginal Southern and Northern consumers;
t¤ =
40°
39
;
iS =
1
40
;
iN =
39
40
;
from which b1 = 1940 and b2 =
1
40 . This tells us that all but the very poorest in the South
are able to buy a car and a permit, while all but the very richest are excluded from using
cars in the North. Suppose 1 < · < 32 as before, but now let ° <
1
160 . Thus, as in the
previous example, ° is small relative to ·. Then the following ranking on outcomes can be
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established, given that ® = 2:
u¤¤i = Yi + 40° ¡ ·2 < Yi + 1 ¡ · = u
¤
i for all i in [0; b1);
u¤¤i = Yi + 1 ¡ 40°39 ¡
·
2
> Yi + 1 ¡ · = u¤i for all i in [b1; 12);
u¤¤i = Yi +
40
39
° ¡ ·
2
< Yi + 1 ¡ · = u¤i for all i in [12 ; b2);
u¤¤i = Yi + 1 ¡ 40° ¡ ·2 > Yi + 1 ¡ · = u
¤
i for all i in [b2; 1):
That is, those from both regions who are excluded from driving cars are worse o¤ than under
the free market solution, while those from both regions who are able to buy cars and bene…t
from reduced pollution are made better o¤ under the permit system.
5 Politico-economic implications of permits
One of the key implications of our analysis is that the allocation of permits across regions is
likely to determine the political support for the scheme as a whole. The permit allocation of
the previous section would have been very popular in the South, and if held to a referendum
would almost certainly have been supported by a democratic majority. In the North, by
sharp contrast, where only the very richest could a¤ord to purchase the permits required to
drive a car, the scheme would be very unlikely to receive a democratic mandate.
We can use the model to set up a framework for thinking about the political constraints
on the adoption of permit trading schemes for the solution of environmental problems. The
approach that we will take is to assume that the representative citizen in a country supports
the scheme if it bene…ts them, and votes against if it does not. This is admittedly a simplistic
assumption. It may not always be appropriate to think of national support being given to
an environmental regime simply on the basis of whether it is in direct national interest. For
example, at COP6 countries such as Sweden rejected the US proposal to include forests as
carbon sinks as part of the regime, even though it was in their direct national interest to do
so because, accounting for their own sizable domestic forests they would be able to increase
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emissions, rather than reduce them as under currently binding requirements (see Houlder
2000). The reason given was said to be that this proposal risked undermining e¤orts to
achieve global carbon emissions reductions, suggesting that pure short-run national interest
is not always the right way to evaluate support for schemes to improve the environment.
This objection notwithstanding, we will use exactly this criteria as a relatively simple way to
show how political constraints can restrict the set of environmental economic regimes that
are viable, leaving more complex political considerations for future work.
Suppose that in order to be introduced the permit trading scheme must receive popular
democratic support from both regions. Let each region vote as a whole on whether the
permit trading scheme should be introduced. Furthermore, suppose that a majority of …fty
percent is required within each region for overall regional support to be declared. We seek
a permit allocation in North and South that will bring this about. Continue to assume
that the intension behind the tradable permit scheme is to reduce car use by a half; then
as before we have b1 + b2 = 12 . But now for democratic support within the South we
require b1 =
¡
1
2 ¡ iS
¢ ¸ 12b = 14 ; the equivalent democratic constraint in the North is
b2 = (1 ¡ iN ) ¸ 12b = 14 .
The unique equilibrium solution to this problem is given by the following
30 tickets allocated to each i in [0; b);
10 tickets allocated to each i in [b; 1);
t¤ =
4°
30
:
The marginal Southern consumer uses their entire endowment on the purchase of a car and
10 tickets, while the marginal Northern consumer has to purchase 30 tickets. Thus
iS =
1
4
iN =
3
4
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giving b1 = b2 = 14 . Half of those in each region buy a car. We now need to verify that
the half of the population in each region who buy a car are indeed better o¤ than in the
absence of the scheme, and can therefore be expected to give it their support. Imposing the
same restrictions as before on parameter values (1 < · < 3=2 and ° < 1=160) the following
ranking on outcomes can be established:
u¤¤i = Yi + 4° ¡ ·2 < Yi + 1 ¡ · = u
¤
i for all i in [0; b1);
u¤¤i = Yi + 1 ¡ 4°3 ¡
·
2
> Yi + 1 ¡ · = u¤i for all i in [b1; 12);
u¤¤i = Yi +
4°
3
¡ ·
2
< Yi + 1 ¡ · = u¤i for all i in [12 ; b2);
u¤¤i = Yi + 1 ¡ 4° ¡ ·2 > Yi + 1 ¡ · = u
¤
i for all i in [b2; 1):
This ranking shows that the half of the population in each region that buy a car are better
o¤ than without the scheme, and are therefore assumed to vote for it. This is su¢cient to
give it an overall democratic mandate.
An important point to note is that democratic support could not be obtained for a
reduction in car use greater than 50 percent, even if this were deemed necessary, say by
some objective scienti…c criterion. For example the Henley Centre (2000) have estimated
that even with green house gas emission cuts of 60 percent over the next decade, the rise in
the Earth’s temperature will not be halted, but may be restricted to 2C by 2100. Suppose,
purely for the purposes of illustration, that a 1 percent reduction in car ownership were
associated with a 1 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions. The results of our model
suggest that the reductions called for may in fact be politically infeasible under the regime
being advocated in the Kyoto Protocol.
6 Conclusions
This chapter has taken as its main motivation developing country concerns over the Kyoto
Protocol. It has rationalised these in the form of a simple theoretical model which shows
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how, under one particular con…guration of the scheme, poorer countries are made worse o¤
under a market controlled by pollution permit trade than they would be otherwise.
To do this, we …rst show how unregulated car use, which creates a widespread externality,
leads to a Pareto ine¢cient outcome. We then demonstrate how pollution can be internalised
through the introduction of a tradeable emissions permit system. This regime leads to
a reduction in the pollution level, and therefore an increase in social surplus. But when
income is unevenly distributed, this may not bring about a Pareto improvement. The permit
requirement e¤ectively makes a car purchase more expensive. When permits are allocated
(equitably) across all countries but income varies so that those in the North are richer than
in the South, only countries in the South reduce car use. They are forced to do so, because
they cannot a¤ord a car and the necessary permits. As a result, Southerners are made worse
o¤ by the scheme, while those in the North bene…t, both by reduced world car use and by
continuing to use cars themselves. If the South is given more permits than the North, then
it is the relatively rich within each region that gain, but the relatively poor in each region
that lose through the rationing of their car use.
This framework was used to examine the politico-economic requirements for a permit
trading scheme to be introduced. If each individual equates being made better o¤ by the
scheme with giving it their democratic support, then the scheme will not be supported if it
requires more than 50% of people in each region to give up their right to drive a car. This
result may have sobering rami…cations. It suggests that certain environmental targets, even
if they are sanctioned scienti…cally, may fail to get political support. Suppose, for example,
that we were told car use must fall by 60% in order to halt global warming. According to
the predictions of our model, such a reduction could not be achieved by the type of tradable
permit scheme that we analyse here.
What does this analysis imply for the future of permit trading under the Kyoto Protocol?
In reducing overall pollution, the scheme has some merit. But our analysis shows that
without careful attention to the design of the system it may have signi…cant pitfalls for poorer
countries as well. Recall that a key assumption was that cars could only be purchased as
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discrete units, and the permit trading system is associated with the purchase of cars. Results
presented in a related paper, Wooders and Zissimos (2001), show that when car services are
in…nitely divisible and there are no …xed costs associated with driving a car (the cost of going
to the car rental o¢ce, for example, and paying a minimum fee) under permit trading this
problem is resolved. Wooders and Zissimos (2001) …nd that indeed the permit trading system
actually bene…ts relatively poor countries, a conclusion much more in line with conventional
wisdom. However, the results of this present paper can by no means be dismissed. As it
stands the system currently being proposed, under the CDM for example, seems to exhibit
some of the key features of indivisibility that underpin the deleterious equity implications
reported here. Pollution permits, or carbon credits as they are sometimes referred to, are
associated with building plant (akin to buying a car), rather than undertaking a marginal
amount of the polluting activity (akin to driving the marginal mile, as analysed by Wooders
and Zissimos 2001). The design of the system in this respect could make a crucial di¤erence
to its ultimate equity implications.
The framework of this paper could also be extended to support arguments for better
provision of public transport. One way to o¤set the di¢culty in dividing the services provided
by a car into smaller units is through improving public transport, particularly by increasing
the frequency of services, so that it becomes more closely substitutable with private car use.
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